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ABSTRACT 
INNOVATIVE USE OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS 
by 
GEORGE T. NICKOLAS 
Chief Review and Compliance Division 
P&P Policy and Management Directorate 
Headquarters, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command 
Rock Island, Illinois 61299-6000 
AUTOVON 793-6379 COMMERCIAL (309) 782-6379 
Fixed price contracts have been proclaimed as the most appropriate type of con-
tracts for the Government to negotiate to the detriment of any consideration of the in-
centive type contracts. This tendency is especially true for the production contracts 
where clear, firm specifications are available to enable the contractor to perform the 
required work. In many cases, however, the use of incentive contracts might prove a 
valuable tool for contracting officers. 
This paper will explore the use of fixed price incentive and cost plus incentive 
fee contracts where negotiations have become deadlocked due to substantial differences 
in negotiation positions between the parties involved. In these situations, there is a 
natural tendency to split the difference which can result in a final settlement in 
which the contracting officer is left feeling uncomfortable. 
Several options open to both parties accompanied with graphical representations 
will also be presented. These options afford incentives in the form of rewards and 
penalties that both the Government and the contractor can accept. Also provided are 
practical solutions and methods for resolving the negotiation impasse, thereby enhan-
cing a settlement to a fixed price incentive contract or an alternative-incentive con-
tract. 
A case study of an actual program will be used to demonstrate the methods proposed 
to achieve acceptable compromises during negotiations. The case study covers an 
Engineering Development Program in a mature phase of development. This study includes 
the use of variable share lines in the same contract and offers an innovative method 
whereby agreements can be reached in even the most difficult negotiations during any 
phase of the product life cycle. 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the use of incentive contracts for Government procurement has ex-
isted since the early part of the 20th century. During the Kennedy era, use of in-
centive contracts became quite fashionable when the Secretary of Defense, Robert Mc-
Namara, directed their use in the early 1960's. McNamara's direction reflected a con-
cern by the Department of Defense (DoD) that the various purchasing elements were 
depending too heavily upon the cost plus fixed fee contracts for the purchase of weapon 
systems and weapon components. 
As a result of the direction from the Secretary of Defense, Government procurement 
personnel were familiarized with incentive contracting procedures through training 
classes, publications on incentive contracting, and "hand's-on" experience. More 
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( recently, emphasis has waned to such an extent that the contracting community has eased 
back into the relative comfort of pre-1960 contracting tradition. In fact, it is safe 
to say that there exists a serious lack of emphasis on incentive contracts in DoD 
today. Courses on incentive contracts are still offered, and employees are encouraged 
to avail themselves of requ1site training. The incentive contract types have been 
retained in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) as an appropriate contract type, 
and there is occasional indication for the use of these contract types. Nevertheless, 
due to their decline in popularity and/or lack of enthusiasm and understanding on ·the 
part of Government contracting personnel, incentive contracting methods are seldom em-
ployed for production phase procurements, to the detriment, sadly, of all parties con-
cerned. 
By the time the acquisition cycle reaches full scale production of the systems and 
component breakout, the contractual instrument primarily selected and negotiated is the 
fixed price contract. The fixed price contract is the ultimate in the eyes of the con-
tracting community because of its relative simplicity and predictability. When con-
tracting officers use the fixed price contract, they have shifted most of the 
cost/price risk onto the contractor. The obvious reluctance on the part of Government 
contracting personnel to depart from the relative safety of this risk-shifting plateau 
into higher cost risks borne by the Government in other contract types is much in 
evidence. Mere mention in passing that an incentive contract might aid in overcoming 
negotiation deadlocks is usually met with negativism and rejection, and the advocate 
quickly assumes the role of "persona non grata." The matter should not be allowed to 
drop here, however, as there are potentially too many advantages to be gained by more 
serious consideration of incentive-type contracts. 
The reason most contract specialists tend to shy away from the use of the incen-
tive contracts should be examined more closely. Human nature tends to resist anything 
that is not performed habitually or involves sailing in uncharted waters. These psy-
chological aspects, combined with inexperience and lack of training, are the key in-
hibiting factors which undermine attempts to explore new vistas of contracting 
methodology. 
COMMON USES OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS 
Incentive contracts are commonly used, with a great deal of success, in latter 
stages of the research and development phases of system and product development. 
Initially, in this latter phase of R&D, a cost plus incentive fee contract is used. In 
large system procurements, multiple incentives are employed to promote technical ad-
vances coupled with cost restraints. In these multiple incentive arrangements, the 
negotiator develops, with the aid of the technical people, a value statement. The 
value statement serves as a yardstick by which the value of certain technical elements 
are established in a cost trade-off arrangement by "goal posting." In such arrange-
ments, miles per hour, distance between fueling, and/or mean time between failures are 
scaled to dollars of cost and program objectives. In this manner, the contractor can-
not achieve a greater profit/fee for higher performance and overrun cost in attaining 
that higher level of performance than was originally intended. What is supposed to 
happen in multiple incentive arrangements is that higher cost targets are subtracted in 
a shared dollar ratio from the amount of fee earned in direct relationship to the in-
creased costs for higher-level performance. This tricky area is where.the balancing of 
the various cost and performance bogies must come into play. 
The contracts that we will discuss will concentrate on cost objectives. In later 
stages, the fixed price incentive may be employed. This phase is followed by the fixed 
price contract phase. The fixed price contract is considered the ultimate of incentive 
contracts. For every dollar that is saved, the contractor benefits 100 percent and 
thus obtains a dollar-for-dollar increase in profit if he underruns the original 
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negotiated cost target. In the case of a fixed price contract, this cost target 
amounts to the sum total of the direct and indirect costs that the parties agree upon 
to be reasonable for the performance of work on the contract. 
What happens when the Government and the contractor cannot agree on the exact dol-
lars which should constitute the cost base of the fixed price contract? In many cases, 
the negotiator is pressured to settle and, consequently, there is often a splitting of 
the difference between the Government's and contractor's positions at that point in the 
negotiations. If the Government's position in a negotiation is $100,000 and the 
contractor's is $110,000, a reasonable settlement might be to establish the cost base 
at $105,000. In a fixed price contract, the result might be a $5,000 windfall for the 
contractor. If ·the contractor is able to meet the contract requirement for $98,000 and 
the contract settlement was $105,000 plus a profit of 10 percent, what would be the 
profit realized? The contractor would have realized $7,000 from the cost savings over 
the settled price plus the negotiated $10,500 profit (in this case 10 percent) or a 
grand total of $17,500 actual profit for the company. This situation would amount to 
17.5 percent profit on the original Government position of $100,000. 
How could the Government negotiator have better served the public's interest in 
this case? The use of an incentive contract in this situation might well be the 
answer. 
WEANING NEGOTIATORS FROM EXCLUSIVE USE OF FIXED PRICE CONTRACTS 
There is considerable pressure from different sources applied to contracting of-
ficers of the Government to award fixed price contracts. This pressure stems from the 
certainty that a specific price will result through assumption by the contractor of all 
the cost risks for the performance of work; the Government liability is limited to 
paying only the dollars identified as the fixed price. As indicated above, in a poor 
settlement, the Government could end up paying the contractor more profit than was ever 
anticipated during the negotiation phase. This may come about not so much by the con-
tractor managing better but rather by his astute negotiations before award of the con-
tract. Government contracting personnel need to be made aware of and develop expertise 
in using different types of contracts that are available to them through the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations. This use of incentive contracts based on the circumstances 
and enhancement of contracting skills by Government personnel should be stressed and 
encouraged so that the Government's interests are better served and optimized. 
Should all this rhetoric be interpreted to mean that we should ref rain from using 
the cost plus fixed fee contracts? The answer is not at all, but ONLY in those cases 
where the cost plus fixed fee contract is clearly the most appropriate. It can be em-
ployed advantageously in settling of letter contracts or ceiling priced delivery orders 
when negotiations have reached a stalemate and most of the work has already been per-
formed by the contractor. Moreover, consideration should be given to cost plus in-
centive fee contracts, particularly for production contracts where wide differences ex-
ist and the Government is not wavering on its cost base position. One of the major 
concerns is to ensure that the Government does not pay more for the items to be pur-
chased or work to be done than is reasonable based upon the cost and technical evalua-
tion performed. How can the parties be protected when both have reasonable doubts on 
the exact amount needed for contract performance? A decision to make use of the ap-
propriate contract type is the solution. An explanation follows of one method that can 
be employed to structure an incentive contract which will alleviate these doubts. 
Let's analyze in detail the normal cost plus incentive fee method for use in reaching 
settlements in difficult situations. 
( 
CASE STUDY Ill 
Let's examine a hypothetical case in which the Government and the contractor are 
negotiating for purchase of, for example, 5,000 Special Purpose Rifles. Assume that 
the contractor has submitted a cost proposal of $302.50 per rifle. The cost breakdown 
includes the following: 
$75.00 Material Costs 
25.00 Material Overhead 
$75.00 Direct Labor 
75.00 Overhead 
$25.00 General and Administrative 
Expense 
$27.50 Profit 
Total Fixed Price Contract $1,512,500.00 
$100.00 
150.00 
25.00 
27.50 
$302.50 
During the negotiations, the Government takes exception to the contractor's 
proposal in material costs, direct labor, and overhead accounts. The contractor has 
projected sales of $10,000,000 on which he had developed his overhead cost charges al-
located to various contract proposals. The Government looks at all of the sales 
projections and notes the contractor has proposals that were submitted to several 
Government purchasing offices that were not included in establishing overhead charges. 
The Government determines that total sales, based upon anticipated award on one or more 
pending Government contracts, would be $15,000,000. This would result in a dilution of 
the contractor's overhead and G&A accounts by an additional $5,000,000 of sales (50 
percent increase in sales). The impact of this dilution would be $141,700 reduction on 
the cost line for the contract being negotiated. The contractor would be hard pressed 
to accept this kind of projection unless he is absolutely certain of award of the con-
tract which the Government had included in the overhead projections. Therefore, there 
would be a substantial disagreement as to overhead costs. 
How can this dilemma be resolved? The contractor could be difficult and hold out 
for his price. He might agree to some material costs and direct labor changes based 
upon another review of his estimates for the job. If this were the first time the con-
tractor is to perform the work, then he might be reluctant to revise his estimates for 
the cost base. If the item has been produced by some other firm, there is always the 
possibility of competition between the two firms. 
In this particular case, let us say that the contractor is sole source and we are 
dealing with the second production procurement. The contractor has had some experience 
with the items, direct labor, and material. The difficulties in negotiation would 
focus on the area of overhead absorption. In this situation, how can the best in-
terests of both parties be served? The use of an incentive contract will fill this 
bill. When negotiations bog down, the Government might propose that a cost plus in-
centive fee contract be utilized. The target cost of that contract could be the 
Government's cost position. This would protect the Government from the contractor's 
making a windfall if he receives award on all of the contracts for which he is under 
consideration. This contract would also protect the contractor if he does not receive 
those pending awards or only part of them. 
Let's graph the proposed numbers (see figure 1). As can readily be seen, the 
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proposed contract will provide the contractor an opportunity to share in any cost un-
derrun from the Government position on a 50/50 basis. On an overrun, the slope will be 
80/20 to the contractor's position and then 50/50 for the balance. The contractor's 
sharing of the cost would also be tempered by a higher profit/fee at the target 
position. 
CASE STUDY 112 
Looking at the same situation as before, but with a s~ightly different twist, as-
sume the contractor will not settle at the Government's target cost. Let us examine 
what can be done in this case. The Government does not want to split the difference 
because it might establish a precedent. 
One solution which comes to mind is a plateau of the fee/profit line in a cost 
plus incentive fee arrangement. The Government and the contractor are $141,700 apart 
in the example outlined above. What we actually have is a cost plus fixed fee contract 
on the cost line between the contractor and the Government's position. Before and 
after that point, we can have the steep sharing arrangement which would stimulate the 
contractor to manage the cost expenditures or to save costs and reap additional 
benefits. Figure 2 graphically depicts this arrangement. As we can see, this is a 
very straightforward, simple solution to the dilemma. 
Simply stated, the Government might also want to consider the use of a fixed price 
incentive contract instead of the cost plus incentive fee contract. The sharing ar-
rangement and the ceiling price can be worked out to provide the Government with the 
measure of protection the contracting activity requires and at the same time assure the 
contractor the degree of security he needs before he will accept the terms of the 
contract. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is strongly recommended that functional contracting offices aggressively 
promote the fixed price incentive contracting method to obtain agreements in difficult 
negotiations. Use of fixed price incentive contracts with shallow slopes of 95/5 or 
90/10 should be seriously considered with the aim of reaching an agreement rather than 
splitting the difference or yielding to a position on costs that may not be in the best 
interest of the Government. The key element to bear in mind is that careful con-
sideration is given the use of these incentive contracts. The benefits that can be 
derived far outweigh any objections or other considerations. 
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FIGURE l 
COST 
The slope between #1 and #2 indicates the 80/20 sharing of cost by the parties. The contractor 
shares 20 cents on each added dollar of cost between point #1 and #2. Beyond point #2 the 
contractor's fee is reduced by 50 cents on eacW added dollar of cost he experiences. Cost 
savings to the left of #1 provide the contractor with 50 cents added fee. for each dollar saved. 
In Figure l point #1 is $1,166,666 estimated cost and $1T6,666 target fee. Point #2 is $1 ,375, 
000 cost and $88,3~6 fee. 
In Figure 2 below there is no slope between #1 and #2. On that line the fee does not change 
when the cost rises between point #1 and #2. There is what can be classified as a Cost Plus 
Fixed Fee contract on that plateau. When cost exceeds point #2 the contractor must share 
cost from his fee pool at the rate of 50 cents per dollar and if the contractor can save cost 
to the left of point #1 on the graph his fee will increase at the rate of 50 cents per dollar 
saved. The fee is $116,666 at any point on the line between $1,166,66& and $1,375,000 of 
cost and only changes when cost exceeds $1,375,000 or underruns cost of $1,166,666. 
FIGURE 2 
#1 
#2 
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